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TEXACo, INC. V SHORT: DORMANT MINERALS AND DUE
PROCESS-A CASE FOR THE IRREBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE?
INTRODUCTION

Much criticism has been leveled against the complex system employed
in the United States for conveying real property.' Land titles are often encumbered by a myriad of outstanding present and future interests, rendering
a single tract of property subject to rights held by diverse, often conflicting
parties. As a result, the conveyance of land titles has become difficult and
costly. 2 Attempts to streamline such systems with retroactive legislation
have commonly been met with constitutional objections from persons whose
3
property has been adversely affected.
I. BACKGROUND

A.

The Problem of Dormant Minerals

One of the most intractable complications in land titles and transfers
occurs when the mineral estate is severed from that of the surface, creating
two wholly separate fee simple estates. 4 In the United States, based on English custom,5 the owner of land can create a fee simple estate in the minerals
by reservation, exception, or grant. 6 After severance each owner has an indefeasible title in a separate corporeal hereditament, with all the incidents of
7
distinct ownership.
Under common law because the mineral estate is corporeal in nature it
cannot be lost by abandonment. 8 Title to the mineral interest must gener1. "The basic system of real estate titles and transfers.., cries out for reexamination and
simplification." Chief Justice Burger, Remarks to the Opening Session of the American Law
Institute (May 21, 1974), reprinted in Presbytery of Southeast Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232,
237 (Iowa 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
2. See, e.g., P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES (2d ed. 1970); L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, THE
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION (1960).
3. See generally J. SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN
LAND (1953) (examines retroactive legislation with reference to constitutional guarantees).
4. See, e.g., Mayberry, Construction of Mineral Exceptions and Reservations, 14 OKLA. L. REV.
457 (1961); Note, Severed Mineral Interests, A Problem Without a Solution?, 46 N.D.L. REV. 451
(1970).
5. Under the common law, the English sovereign owned all mines in which gold or silver
might be found, regardless of the ownership of the surface estate. See 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 586, at 507 (3d ed. 1939).

6. As stated in Smith v. Jones, 21 Utah 270, 272, 60 P. 1104, 1106 (1900): As to mineral
lands, the surface may be owned by one person and the mineral underneath by another, and
...each owner shall have an indefeasible title. When the surface and the underlying mineral
strata are separately owned, they constitute separate corporeal hereditaments, with all the incidents of separate ownership. See also Chicago, Wilmington and Franklin Coal Co. v. Jilek, 42 F.
Supp. 200 (E.D. Ill. 1942); Hummel v. McFadden, 395 Pa. 543, 150 A.2d 856 (1959); 2 H.
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 585 (3d ed. 1939).
7. 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 585-87 (3d ed. 1939).

8. Generally all solid mineral estates are corporeal. See supra note 5. Severed interests in
oil and gas, due to theirferae naturae character, cannot be owned until reduced to actual posses-
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ally be recorded, and is subject to the laws of descent, devise, and conveyance. 9 Once severance has occurred, adverse possession of the surface will
not constitute adverse possession of the underlying mineral estate. 10 With all
the incidents of separate ownership, the mineral estate may be held in
perpetuity with or without subsequent development of the underlying natural resources.
The severed mineral estate is not only relatively indestructible, but also
has assumed a traditional dominance in relation to the surface estate. The
mineral owner continues to have the right to the mineral estate as long as his
activities do not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the surface owner."1 When not specified in the deed, this dominance includes rights of ingress and egress as well as the right to use as much of the surface as is
reasonably necessary to explore for, develop, or produce the minerals. 12 The
uniquely durable nature of the mineral estate, and its dominant position
relative to the surface estate, constitute significant impediments to the development or conveyance of the surface interest. 13
Exacerbating these difficulties are the situations in which record title to
a mineral interest is vested in owners who cannot be located. Typically,
after these estates can no longer be associated with a known record title
holder they are referred to as "dormant mineral interests."', 4 Attempts by
the surface owner to remerge the surface with the mineral interest can be
frustrated further when these dormant mineral interests are owned by a defunct corporation, 15 or when through the laws of devise and descent the minsion, and are therefore usually considered incorporeal. See, e.g., Halbert v. Hendrix, 121 Ind.
App. 43, 95 N.E.2d 221 (1950); Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672
(1944).
9. See, e.g., Pickens v. Adams, 7 Ill.2d 283, 131 N.E.2d 38 (1955).
10. Witness v. Paniman, 120 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1963); see generally Kuntz, Adverse Possession
of Severed Mineral Interests, 5 ROCKY. MTN. MIN. L. INST. 409, 420 (1960) (a severed mineral
interest may be adversely possessed by working of the minerals).
11. Recent cases reaffirm the mineral owner's right to use reasonably the surface to work
the mineral estate. See Yaquina Bay Timber & Logging Co. v. Shiny Rock Mining Corp., 276
Or. 779, 784, 556 P.2d 672, 675 (1976); Lomax v. Henderson, 559 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977). But see Southern Title Insurance Co. v. Oiler, 268 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980);
Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Comment, The
Surface Owner's Estate Becomes Dominant Wyoming's Surface Owner Consent Statute, 16 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 541 (1981).
12. Often the mineral owner has even greater prerogatives based on provisions in the deed
conveying the mineral estate. See generaly Comment, BroadForm Deed-Obstacle to Peacelid Coexistence Between Mineral & Surface Owners, 60 Ky. L.J. 742 (1972) ("broad-form deed" is a typical
name for deeds conveying minerals and giving the new mineral owner a large number of specified rights in using the surface estate to recover the minerals).
13. It is generally more difficult to obtain a bank loan to build on property with a severed
mineral estate. See Brief for Amicus Curiae at 34, Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). See
generally Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs. Conficts Between Surface and Mtneral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 995 (1980).
14. See, e.g., Outerbridge, Missing and Unknown Mineral Owners, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 20-21 (1979); Polston, Legislation, Existing and Proposed, Concerning Marketability of Mineral
Titles, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 73 (1972) (concerned primarily with the Indiana Dormant
Mineral Lapse Act); Street, Needfor Legislation to Eliminate DormantRoyalty Interests, 42 MICH. ST.
B.J. 49 (March 1963); see generally Note, supra note 4.
15. See Knutson, Defunct Companies that Hold Record Ttle to Mining Properties Problems and
Solutions, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 377" (1978).
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eral estate becomes fragmented.
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B. Indiana's Response
In 1971, addressing the problem of dormant mineral interests inhibiting
the development and conveyance of surface estates, the Indiana Legislature
passed the Indiana Dormant Mineral Interests Act 17 (Mineral Lapse Act or
Act). This Act provides that a severed mineral interest not used for a period
of twenty years automatically lapses and reverts to the current surface owner
of the property, unless the mineral owner files a statement of claim 8 in the
local county recorder's office within a specified time period.' 9 The "use" of
a mineral interest sufficient to preclude its extinction includes actual or attempted production of the minerals, payment of rent or royalties to the min20
eral owner, or payment of taxes.
The statute does not require that any specific notice be given to a mineral owner prior to a statutory lapse of the mineral estate. The Act does set
forth a procedure, however, by which a surface owner who has succeeded to
the ownership of an underlying mineral estate pursuant to the statute may
give notice that the mineral interest has lapsed and quiet title to the mineral
estate by virtue of a judicially recognized remerger with the surface
2
interest. '

C.

The Case

On April 23, 1977, the surface owner of a 132-acre Indiana tract gave
notice by both publication and mail that the underlying mineral estate, severed in 1942 and 1944, had lapsed. Texaco, Inc., with ten other parties,
responded by filing statements of claim. Thereafter, the surface owner filed
16. According to Kuntz, Old and New Solutions to the Problem of the Outstanding Undeveloped
Mineral Interest, 28 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 81, 82 (1971): "Once severed, even though
the mineral interest was not fragmented when originally granted, the passage of time serves to
do so. Family settlements are made and wills are drafted with an understandable lack of concern over the effect upon a mineral interest that is not productive."
17. INn. CODE §§ 32-5-11-1 to -8 (1976). This Act, like similar ones passed in several other
states, is based loosely on the Louisiana Act providing for "liberative prescription" of mineral
interests. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5 to -:34 (West 1975). In Louisiana neither solid minerals nor oil and gas are deemed susceptible of ownership apart from the lands until reduced to
possession. A conveyance purporting to sell minerals in place merely creates a right in the
nature of a servitude, defined as the right of another to explore for the produce minerals. Id
§ 31:21. The Louisiana Mineral Code expressly provides that a mineral servitude is extinguished by prescription resulting from non-use for 10 years. Id. § 31:27. Such prescription may,
however, be interrupted by actual production of minerals or by good faith operations for the
discovery and production of minerals. Id. § 31:36. See Hardy, Public Policy and Temtinablity of
Mineral Rights in Louisiana, 26 LA. L. REV. 731 (1966). For an indication of how this Act functions in practice, see Nabors, The Lousiana Mineral Servitude and Royalty Doctrines. A Report to the
Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, 25 TUL. L. REV. 30 (1950).
18. The notice must be filed prior to the end of the 20 year period or within a two year
grace period after the effective date of the Act (September 2, 1971).
19. IND. CODE § 32-5-11-1 (1976). One exception is provided to this rule; if an owner of 10
or more interests in the same county files a statement of claim that inadvertently omits some of
those interests, the omitted interests may be preserved by a supplemental filing made within 60
days of receiving actual notice of the lapse. Id. § 32-5- I1-5.

20. Id § 32-5-11-3.
21.

Id § 32-5-11-6.
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an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the rights of the mineral own22
ers had lapsed.
Stipulating to the facts, and alleging the unconstitutionality of the law,
Texaco claimed that the lack of prior notice of the lapse deprived them of
property without due process of law. 23 Texaco further argued that the stat2 4
ute effected a taking of property for public use without just compensation.
The trial court declared the statute unconstitutional, but the Indiana
Supreme Court reversed. 25 In a five-to-four ruling, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Indiana's highest court upholding
26
that statute's constitutionality.
Citing the common law doctrine that everyone is presumed to know the
law, the Court held that the Mineral Lapse Act did not violate procedural
due process. Because notice was actually contained in the Indiana Act, the
Court held that passage of the statute was, in and of itself, sufficient notice of
all the provisions contained therein. 27 Answering a major contention of the
appellants that the Mineral Lapse Act deprived them of the opportunity to
respond to the assertion of abandonment, the Court distinguished the facts
of Texaco v. Short from those in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 28
Mullane requires that notice be "reasonably calculated" to apprise parties of
a judicial proceeding affecting their interests. 29 The Court noted that the
Mineral Lapse Act was self-executing upon the passage of time, not providing for any adjudicatory hearing prior to termination, and thus the Mullane
standard did not apply. 30 The Court also held that because the property
31
was deemed abandoned, no compensation was due to the appellants.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions examined the aggregate
reasonability of the Mineral Lapse Act. The majority employed a minimal
substantive due process review and found the statute constitutional, based
on the examples of similar statutes. 32 The dissent employed a stricter standard, which it reasoned was applicable due to the retroactive nature of the
statute. Based on this stricter standard, the dissent found the statute to be
22. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 521 (1982).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Id amend. V. The fifth amendment prohibition against the federal government taking
private property for public use is equally applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). The appellants
also contended that the Act violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
and that it constituted an impairment of contracts in violation of article 1, § 10 of the United
States Constitution. These contentions, however, are beyond the scope of this comment.
25. Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980).
26. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). Justice Stevens, wrote the opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice
Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell.
27. Id at 531.
28. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Seealso Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
29. 339 U.S. at 319.
30. 454 U.S. at 534.
31. Id at 530. For an interesting, related review of possible due process violations regarding a similar extinguishment of unpatented mining claims, see generally Note, New Federal Min•
ng Law Abandonment rovwosus. A Violaton of Du Process of Law?, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 647

(1981).
32. 454 U.S. at 529.
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an unreasonable abridgment of due process.

This comment examines the Texaco decision in view of other statutes
that function to extinguish a vested interest in land without notice or compensation. The assertion is made that such statutes are constitutional when
the government is acting as an arbiter between competing interests in the
same property, a situation not presented by the Mineral Lapse Act.
It is further asserted that the retroactive nature of the statute called for
an intermediate level of substantive due process review, which would have
resulted in the statute being declared unconstitutional. Instead, the Court
simply conducted a minimal substantive due process review consistent with
prospective economic and social legislation, and upheld the statute.
The analysis closes by introducing a doctrine previously used by the
Court to provide an intermediate level of substantive due process review.
The argument is made that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine should
have been used in Texaco to force Indiana to adopt a more constitutionally
acceptable solution to the problem of severed mineral interests.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Government as Arbiter

The United States Constitution provides that property shall not be
taken without due process of law, 34 nor taken for a public purpose without
just compensation. 35 Notwithstanding these provisions, the states are
charged with the responsibility of defining the general nature of property
and establishing criteria for the resolution of competing claims. 36 An essential problem that the Texaco Court faced was determining the extent to
which, and under what circumstances, a state may redefine vested property
interests without violating these constitutional protections.
The Mineral Lapse Act functions retroactively to define those mineral
estates requiring periodic reaffirmation of ownership. 37 As the majority
opinion stated, there are statutory precedents for altering the character of
property interests. Such relevant precedents include state enactments of adverse possession, recording, and marketable title statutes, each requiring
some affirmative act by the owner to preserve the property interest.
In Hawktis v. Barney's Lessee, 38 the Court upheld a Kentucky statute
33. Id. at 540.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Id. amend. V.
36. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1971) the Court stated: "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as State law .... " Id at 577.
37. As stated by the Court in Texaco:
The State of Indiana has defined a severed mineral estate as a "vested property interest," entitled to "the same protection as are fee simple titles." Through its Dormant
Minerals Act, however, the State has declared that this property interest is of less than
absolute duration; retention is conditioned on the performance of at least one of the
actions required by the Act. (footnotes omitted).
454 U.S. at 525.
38. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831); see alsoMontoya v. Gonzales, 232 U.S. 375 (1914).
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which allowed a defendant, who had resided for more than seven years on
property with a claim of right, to assert superior title over the record landowner. Initially such adverse possession statutes were deemed constitutional
based on their close analogy to statutes of limitation; when the state acts to
withdraw a remedy (ejectment of a trespasser) it is not acting to destroy a
right. 39 This analogy was flawed because the effect of such adverse possession statutes, however, was not merely to withdraw the remedy of ejectment,
but also to divest the former title holder of property without due process or
compensation, and to vest title in the trespasser who
had developed an inter40
est in the property through continued possession.
Incorporating and broadening the equitable doctrine of bond fide purchaser, many land title recording statutes provide that an otherwise valid
transfer of property that is not recorded may be defeated by a subsequent
transfer.4 1 The Court inJackson v. Lampht're42 approved the constitutionality
of such recording statutes, even when applied retroactively.
A third type of statute that may act to divest a property owner of an
interest in land upon failure to re-register that interest periodically, is a marketable title act. Although such acts have not been specifically considered by
the United States Supreme Court, they have met with wide approval in vari43
ous state courts.
Marketable title acts facilitate land transactions by permitting a buyer
to rely on a record title search covering a limited period to determine outstanding interests in property. 44 The interest is generally void if not noted in
39. See, e.g., Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 61 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628,
634 (1877).
40. The Court in Texaco, acknowledging this defect in reasoning, stated that if the practical
consequence of eliminating a remedy is identical to the consequence of extinguishing a right,
the contemporary constitutional analysis is the same. 454 U.S. at 528. Curiously, although the
Court acknowledged the invalidity of this differentiation between right and remedy, it used the
elimination of remedy concept in analogizing between adverse possession and the Mineral
Lapse Act. The Court's analysis seems to imply that although the constitutional justification for
adverse possession provisions is no longer cognizable, the cases decided upon the discredited
concept remain as legitimate precedents for the decision in Texaco. Id. at 528. See, e.g., El Paso
v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506-07 (1965); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 430 (1933).
41. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 787 (1981).
42. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830). The Court stated that:
It is within the undoubted power of state legislatures to pass recording acts, by which
the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded
within the limited time; and the power is the same whether the deed is dated before or
after the passage of the recording act.
Id at 289.
43. See, e.g., City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1978); Presbytery of
Southeast Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975) (possibility of reverter can be constitutionally extinguished due to the failure to comply with rerecording provision of marketable title statute). See generally P. BASYE, supra note 2, at §§ 17189; L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 3-16; Aigler, A Supplement to "Constitutionality of
Marketable Title Acts-1951-1957," 56 MICH. L. REv. 225 (1957); Barnett, Marketable Title
ActsPanaceaor Pandemonim?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 72-76 (1967) (effect of marketable title acts on
mineral interests); Basye, Trends & Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47 IOWA L. REV. 261

(1962).

For a detailed analysis of the current functioning of a marketable title provision, see

Conine & Morgan, The Wyoming Marketable Title
Act-A Re, ion of Real Property Law, 16 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 181 (1981).

44. Marketable title acts are "designed to shorten the period of search required to establish
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the record chain of title during the statutorily designated limiting period. As
a practical matter, such interests are commonly noted by the grantor of land
in the deed of conveyance, thus preserving the encumbrance. Nevertheless,
the holder of an incorporeal hereditament in land may re-record before the
expiration of the limiting period, and thereby secure the interest from lapsing by giving this constructive notice to interested parties.
Despite theJackson Court's approval of retroactive recording statutes in
that case, the Court cautioned that similar provisions may be unconstitutional as an unreasonable denial of right. 4 5 The mechanism employed in the
Mineral Lapse Act is similar to that used in adverse possession, recording,
and marketable title statutes. Each of these four statutes is or can be a retroactive measure compelling an owner of real property to perform some affirmative act to preserve his or her property interest. Failure to perform the
act, in all four situations, can result in the extinguishment of a fee simple
absolute without notice or compensation.
Although the mechanism employed in the Mineral Lapse Act and adverse possession, recording, and marketable title statutes is similar, and
therefore arguably reasonable, the justification for state action under the
Mineral Lapse Act is less clear. In the adverse possession, recording, and
marketable title statutes, the government is acting as an arbiter between parties who have a "colorable" claim to the same property, adjusting the legal
rights between competing interests. The Mineral Lapse Act, however, functions to transfer property to a vertically adjacent landowner who may previously have received compensation as the grantor of the property.
Recording acts and marketable title acts both protect a bona fide purchaser of property who has no constructive knowledge of an outstanding
interest prior to conveyance. In either situation, the grantee must take reasonable steps, as defined by statute, to ascertain ownership of property before
conveyance. After taking these steps the state, as arbiter, favors the bona
fide purchaser who has a colorable claim to the property, over the former
46
owner who failed to record properly the property title.
Adverse possession is usually viewed as a record title owner losing property through his own laches. The record title owner's property interest, however, is lost to an individual who has achieved an equitable interest after
using the property, under a claim of right, for the statutory period. 47 The
state, again acting as arbiter, favors the latter equitable interest over the
claim of the negligent title holder.
In the examples of adverse possession, recording, and marketable title
acts, the state is performing the reasonable and necessary function of-declaring rights between differing colorable claims to real property. 48 Under the
Mineral Lapse Act, however, the state is not acting as an arbiter to protect a
title in real estate and given effect and stability to record titles by rendering them marketable
and alienable .
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Osage, 176 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Iowa
1970).
45. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 289.
46.

See generally P. BASYE, supra note 2.

47.
48.

See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, 123 Fla. 302, 166 So. 820 (1936).
For a discussion of criteria used to determine when the state effectuates a taking requir-

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:3

bona fide purchaser, or to favor one who over time has developed an equitable interest in the property. Under the Act the government, in an attempt to
promote the convenience of the surface owner in developing or conveying his
estate, intrudes on the relationship between adjoining land owners, whose
only link after severance is vertical proximity. The Act could, therefore, be
viewed as arbitrary state action benefitting one landowner by divesting an49
other with an equally valid claim.
B.

Substantive Due Process and Retroactive Legislation

To state that the Mineral Lapse Act is a less justifiable and more arbitrary use of state power than adverse possession, recording, and marketable
title statutes does not necessarily mean that the Act is unconstitutional.
Starting with Nebbia v. New York 5° , the Court has ostensibly given wide latitude to state governments to fashion prospective economic and social policy
not violative of fundamental rights. 5 ' Statutes that have a "reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminadue process guidelines for
tory, ' ' 52 meet the Court's modern substantive
53
prospective economic and social legislation.
In defining the nature of a severed mineral interest, it is undisputed that
Indiana can prospectively legislate the nature, character, and duration of
54
The Mineral Lapse
any property interest before that interest is created.
Act, however, functions retroactively, imposing a condition on the retention
55
of vested fee simple estates, which when created were of absolute duration.
ing just compensation, see Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971). But see Berger, A Policy Analysis ofthe Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1974).
49. A sufficiently arbitrary statute may constitute a violation of substantive due process.
See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). But see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1927) (the Court upheld the power of the State of Virginia to destroy ornamental cedar trees
on private property that were a perceived threat to the apple industry).
50. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Court in Nebbia stated that:
[A] State is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose . . . . If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied ....
Id. at 537.
51. According to the Court, property is not a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
52. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
53. The Court stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955): "[Tlhe
law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." For further examples of the
Court's post-Nebbia substantive due process reasoning, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730
(1963); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
54. A prospective law incorporates its provisions and limitations into all future transactions. Thus, there is no question concerning the constitutionality of the Mineral Lapse Act
regarding mineral estates created after the passage of the Act. See Texaco, 454 U.S. at 542.
55. At a minimum, the Court has required a statutory grace period provided within retroactive legislation to allow affected persons a reasonable time to bring their actions into conformity with the law. In Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902) the Court stated:
It may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation must proceed on the idea
that the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the courts. A stat-
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The United States Supreme Court has considered such retroactive laws
56
affecting vested rights to be suspect violations of substantive due process.
Although mandating higher scrutiny than prospective legislation, not all retroactive statutes are unconstitutional. 57 The Court generally employs an
implicit weighing, rejecting only retroactive statutes that are considered
58
unreasonable.
In utilizing this higher standard, the Texaco Court determined whether
the Act was irrational or arbitrary to such an extent as to be a violation of
substantive due process. 5 9 The critical question was whether this retroactive
measure under theJackson standard was unconstitutional as an unreasonable
60
denial of right.
In reviewing the Supreme Court's evaluation of retroactive legislation,
one commentator has identified three criteria for assessing the reasonableness of such enactments. According to this analysis, the Court balances the
following three factors: the nature and strength of the public interest served
by the statute, the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the asserted pre-enactment right, and the nature of the right that the statute
6
alters. t
The first criterion, the strength of the public interest served by the statute could not bar the existing right of claimants without affording this opportunity; if
it should attempt to do so, it would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful
attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its provisions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable time after they take effect for
the commencement of suits upon existing causes of action.
Id at 62. See also Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1877); Kolker v. Biggs, 203 Md. 137,
99 A.2d 743 (1953).
56. See generaly Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Consttutionahty of .Retroactive Legislation,
73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960).

57. Id at 694.
58. Compare Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) with Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). Useoy and RailroadRetirement Board are similar
cases concerning the constitutionality of legislation retroactively requiring employers to give
retired employees specified benefits. The Court overturned the statute in RailroadRetirement Bd.
but let it stand in Use7y. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)
(description of constitutional limitations placed on retroactive laws); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (land use statute invalidated as a retroactive taking of property
without compensation). See generally Hochman, supra note 56; Orland & Stebing, Retroactwity in
Review. The Federal and Washington Approaches, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 855 (1981); Slawson, Consttutional and Legislative Considerationsin Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216 (1960); Smead,
The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation. A Basic Principle of Jursprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775
(1936); Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TEX. L. REV. 409 (1928); Stimson, Retroactive
Apphcation of Law--A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 30 (1939). For specific
commentary on Indiana's Mineral Lapse Act as retroactive legislation, see Polston,supra note 14
(suggests a model statute upon which the Indiana Act is based); Note, Constitutionality of Retroactive Land Statutes-Indiana'sModel Dormant Mineral Act, 12 IND. L. REv. 455, 480-86 (1979).
59. Many attempts have been made to define precisely a "retroactive" law. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 58. For purposes of simplicity, it will be assumed in this article that "[a]
retroactive statute is one which gives to pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from that
which it would have had without the statute." Hochman, supra note 56, at 692.
60. Jackson, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 290.
61. Hochman, supra note 56, at 697. Generally retroactive legislation is considered in four
distinct types of cases: 1) cases that involved emergency retroactive legislation; 2) cases that
challenge the constitutionality of curative statutes; 3) cases that involve the constitutional merits
of retrospective taxing legislation; and 4) cases that contest the constitutionality of retrospective
general legislation. Id at 698, 703, 706. The Court has been most amenable to legislation in the
first two categories, and somewhat less so to the third. Id The Court has been most suspect of
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ute, is difficult to determine. The public is served when land titles are rendered marketable and a valuable resource such as land is employed in an
efficient manner. The benefit rendered by the statute to the private interests
of the surface landowners is not a factor under this criterion. The only legitimate consideration is the general public interest served by the promotion of
an efficient, unrestricted market for land transfers.
The second criterion, the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the asserted pre-enactment right, can also be misleading. On its face,
the Act does little more than require a simple reaffirmation of ownership
where affirmation was not previously required. The Mineral Lapse Act operates, however, to essentially change a fee simple absolute in land to a terminable estate with a means to retain ownership. Therefore, the
preenactment right of ownership in perpetuity can be extinguished under
the Act. In practice the statute may function as a taking of property without
notice of the new reaffirmation requirement.
The nature of the right that the statute alters is the third criterion. The
Mineral Lapse Act can destroy an ownership right to an estate in minerals,
without any provision for compensation. On balance the three criteria
62
would mandate a more thorough analysis than that provided by the Court.
The implication of the Court's cursory treatment is that retroactive statutes
are being evaluated with greater deference.
Another test of the reasonableness of retroactive legislation is the degree
to which the statutes disrupt "reasonable expectations" of property owners.
The test has been used to determine whether state action constitues a taking
of property requiring compensation, 6 3 and whether a retroactive law violates
substantive due process. 64 Under this test, a change in zoning or an increase
in property tax is not violative of due process because such actions do not
disrupt the reasonable expectations that property owners have upon acquiring land. A state using the land for a public purpose without compensation
would, however, violate this criterion. The fundamental justification of this
approach is that efficiency is fostered when individuals are allowed to plan
economic activities with reasonable certainty.
The owners of mineral interests could reasonably expect a greater degree of state regulation of their property than that which existed when such
rights were acquired. Given the common law rule that a corporeal property
interest cannot be abandoned, however, a statutory presumption of abanthose cases in the fourth category into which the Texaco decision falls. Id See also, J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 419-37 (1978).
62. By returning a previously conveyed property interest, in some instances to the seller, an
argument could be made that the Mineral Lapse Act works as an impairment of contract in
violation of U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. Since the 1930's, however, the Court has taken a deferential approach to statutes that potentially violate this constitutional provision. It can be argued
that this constitutional infirmity has merely become an element of the permissive substantive
due process balancing. Set, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57
HARV. L. REv. 512 (1944). But see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977);
Note, Revival of the Contract Clause, 39 IOWA ST. L.J. 195 (1978) (contract clause is apparently
applied more directly when a state is a party to the contract).
63. Berger, supra note 48.
64. Smith, supra note 58. See also Hochman, supra note 56, at 727.
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donment absent formal reaffirmation of the intent to own would not be a
reasonable expectation of these property owners.
Both the majority and dissent in Texaco examined the reasonableness of
the Mineral Lapse Act, but neither employed the previously suggested criteria for considering retroactive legislation. With the dearth of modern precedent, and the consequent lack of a strong analytical framework for
considering retroactive legislation, the majority made only brief references to
the substantive due process aspects of the Act. The Court noted that "the
State has not exercised . . . power in an abitrary manner," 6 5 and that the
statute "furthers a legitimate state goal." 66 This terse discussion implies that
the Court has adopted a permissive view of state enactment of retroactive
statutes, similar to the minimal scrutiny currently applied to prospective legislation. 67 In essence, the Court, by failing to consider the retroactive effect,
seems to adopt a deferential stance to formerly suspect retroactive legislation. This approach gives the states greater latitude to fashion laws that will
solve a perceived problem, even at the expense of disturbing vested property
rights.
The Texaco decision can, however, be better understood by examining
the implicit substantive due process analysis actually employed. Contrary to
the standard analysis of viewing specific constitutional objections to the statute, the Court initially found the overall Mineral Lapse Act reasonable, and
only then proceeded to dismiss specific constitutional objections. Essentially
the Court balanced the total effect of the Mineral Lapse Act, weighing the
constitutional rights at issue against the state's prerogative to impinge on
these rights in furtherance of a governmental objective. The dissent used a
similar methodology. After finding the total statute unreasonable as suspect
retroactive legislation, the dissent sympathetically examined the specific constitutional objections. 68 Although Texaco represents the Court's current analytical framework for evaluating retroactive statutes, neither the majority
nor the dissent explicitly admitted their adoption of this substantive due process approach.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS REVIEW

AND THE IRREBUTTABLE

PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE

The constitutional deficiency of the Mineral Lapse Act is illustrated by
examining two presumptions on which it is based; one a legal maxim, the
other a statutory determination. The first is the common law maxim that
everyone is presumed to know the law. Despite the well-reasoned dissent65. 454 U.S. at 529.
66. Id.
67. The Court has expressed a stricter view towards retroactive general legislation as recently as 1976. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). Although upholding the statute in question, the Usety Court cautioned that: "It does not follow ... that what [a
state] can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The retrospective aspects of
legislation, as well as the prospective, must meet the test of due process, and the justification for
the latter may not suffice for the former." Id at 16-17.
68. 454 U.S. at 540.
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ing opinion to the contrary, 69 the majority states that by the end of the twoyear grace period all mineral owners are deemed to have constructive notice
of the statutory requirements for retaining their interests. 7 ° The second presumption is statutory, providing that after a specified period of non-use the
mineral interest is deemed abandoned, absent the filing of a notice of
71
retention.
Both the assumed knowledge, and the deemed abandonment are conclusive, irrebuttable presumptions, which cannot be disputed once the time
period has elapsed. 72 The harsh consequence of the two presumptions, forfeiture of a vested property interest gives rise to the objection that such legislation is unreasonable, and thus is an unconstitutional violation of
substantive due process.
In examining similar statutes, the Court has said that the Constitution
disfavors statutory irrebuttable presumptions such as that providing for
abandonment in the Mineral Lapse Act. 73 Illustrating this doctrine is the
Court's decision in Slanley v. Illinois.74 In this case the Court held that an
69. Given the unusual retroactive character of the Mineral Lapse Act, the dissent implies
there is a "good faith" notice requirement on the state to inform those directly affected. The
dissent indicates that the "reasonably calculated" standard introduced in Mullane is applicable
to the non-adjudicatory state action in Texaco. The Texaco situation, according to the dissent,
"highlights the limited circumstances in which the State's reliance on a presumption of knowledge strains the constitutional requirement that the liberty and property of persons be dealt
with fairly and rationally by the State." Id. at 546 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Utilizing substantive due process analysis, the dissent questions what rational state objective is served by not
affording the mineral estate owner greater notice of his imminent abandonment. Id. at 552.
70. The Court relies upon North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1924)
to support the statement that: "(P]ersons owning property within a State are charged with
knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such property."
454 U.S. at 532 (footnote omitted). See generally Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233
(1944); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1972); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S.
241 (1907); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
71. An interesting comparison can be drawn between the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act and
the Virginia Statute having essentially the same function, but relying on a wholly different
rebuttable presumption. VA. CODE §§ 55-153 to -155 (1981). The Virginia statute provides that
when a mineral interest has not been transferred or separately taxed, or when exploration has
not been conducted for a period of 35 years, the land covering such interest is deemed to contain
no minerals. Id § 55-154. The surface owner is then entitled to bring a suit to quiet title to
such mineral interest in himself. If the mineral owner defends, he is given six months from the
date of the hearing in which to explore for minerals. Within that six month period, if he can
establish that there are minerals, the court will order the mineral interest to be separately taxed.
If he fails to establish the existence of minerals, the interest is extinguished. Id § 55-155. See
generally Polston, supra note 14, at 89.
72. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-32, at 898 (1978); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to
Strict Scrutiny. From Rodriguez to La Fleur, 62 GEO. L. J. 1173 (1974); Note, The Irnebuttable
Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive
Presumption Doctrine.. Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions. An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975); Comment, Some Thoughts on
the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REV. 644 (1974).
73. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973), the Court stated that "permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments."
74. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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unwed father must be given a chance in a custody proceeding to prove his
fitness to be a parent. The Court stated that the administrative convenience
of an irrebuttable presumption cannot preclude an individual's right to be
heard. 75 In Vlandis v. Klhne, 76 the Court cast doubt on the factual basis for a
state's restrictive statutory determination of in-state residency for tuition
purposes, and held that "when the State has reasonable alternative means of
making the crucial determination," the Court should declare the conclusive
presumption unconstitutional. 77 In Bell v. Burson, 78 the Court determined
that use of a motor vehicle is a property interest. Furthermore, a self-executing statute that suspends the drivers license of an individual involved in an
auto accident, without any determination of fault or liability, is unconstitutional. 79 The Court has used the irrebuttable presumption doctrine in cases
of statutory deprivation of protected rights when it determined there was the
likelihood that a hearing procedure could be developed by the government,
favoring individualized determination over the administrative convenience
of a conclusive presumption. 8°
In effect, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine provides a higher level
of scrutiny for economic and social legislation than that available under the
Court's substantive due process criteria.8 ' The future scope of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was limited by the Court's decision in Weinberger
v. Sa66/,8 2 in which the Court stated this doctrine would only be used to guarantee a constitutionally protected right or status. The doctrine, has not been
specifically overruled, although it is no longer being utilized as aggressive
enforcement mechanism of due process rights.
75. Id at 656-58. The Court stated:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is
a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular,
that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy.
id at 656.
76. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
77. Id at 452.
78. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
79. In direct contradiction to the reasoning of the Court in Texaco that "reasonably calculated" notice need only be given for an adjudication of rights, the Court, referring to the selfexecuting statute at issue in the earlier Be/ case stated that "due process requires that when a
State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective." Bell, 402 U.S. at 542.
80. In describing the basic constitutional rationale for the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, Justice Marshall stated that:
[W]here the private interests affected are very important and the governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty by a well-designed hearing procedure,
[the Due Process Clause] requires the Government to act on an individualized basis,
with general propositions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burdenshifting devices.
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (Marshall, J., concurring).
81. In his dissent in Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Justice Rehnquist warned that: "The Court's disenchantment with 'irrebuttable presumptions,' and its preference for 'individualized determination,' is in the last analysis nothing less than an attack upon
the very notion of lawmaking itself." Id at 660 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
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The Mineral Lapse Act is well suited for application of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine. A legal determination of abandonment is a necessary
prerequisite for the state to transfer title of the mineral interest to the owner
of the surface estate without giving compensation. Despite the Act's provision for a hearing procedure to judicially determine the surface owner's
claim to the minerals, the issue of abandonment by the mineral owner is
irrebuttably determined by the expiration of the statutory period. After this
period lapses, the mineral owner is foreclosed from challenging the abandonment determination in any judicial forum. 8 3 By employing a statutorily conclusive presumption of abandonment, rather than an in rem adjudication of
status, it is possible that some non-abandoned estates will be extinguished
without due process or compensation. As in Vlandis, there is doubt cast on
the underlying validity of the determination that the irrebuttable presumption attempts to provide.
The Weiberger restriction is met in the Texaco context because the Mineral Lapse Act can deprive a landowner of an interest in property without
84
In adcompensation upon an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment.
dition, the retroactive effect of the Act mandates an intermediate level of
substantive due process scrutiny, which the irrebuttable presumption doctrine provides.
While the Court could use this doctrine to overturn a number of laws
that contain an irrebuttable presumption, usually the issue does not arise
because the irrebuttable presumptions are employed to circumvent difficult
problems of proof.8 5 In contrast, it would be possible for the Mineral Lapse
Act to mandate a simple, efficient in rem adjudication to determine the intent
of a mineral owner to abandon the interest, similar to that used in the Vir86
ginia statute.
A mineral owner who neither has actual knowledge of the Mineral
Lapse Act nor has any intention to abandon, can lose his property by virtue
of presumptions to the contrary.8 7 The Court in Texaco could have found
83. According to one commentator: "The primary objection to conclusive presumptions is
that they usurp the judicial fact-finding function." Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative
to Strict S&rutiny." From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J. 1173, 1197 (1974).

84. The Court, and various commentators have struggled to determine when social and
economic legislation, not violative of fundamental rights, results in a taking of property mandating compensation. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (examination of the application of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law to
Grand Central Terminal, owned by Pennsylvania Transportation Co.); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (balances police power of state against private property interests). Since there was no issue in Texaco of a taking by regulation, or a partial taking, for purposes of this comment it is assumed that the denial of a property right in a severed mineral
interest, absent abandonment, would be a taking requiring compensation.
85. See supra note 72. For example, when a state enacts a law under its police power to
limit the speed of vehicles on a highway, an inherent presumption is that a vehicle traveling in
excess of this speed is dangerous to the public safety. The presumption is irrebuttable, in that
an individual is not allowed to assert that, because of excellent road conditions or superior
driving ability, it was acutally safe to exceed the stated maximum speed. To allow this assertion, under these circumstances, would inextricably complicate the judicial function.
86. See supra note 71.
87. A mining firm may find it economically advantageous to acquire and hold mineral
interests for future production and thereby neither currently work the mineral estate nor intend
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the Mineral Lapse Act unconstitutional based upon the dissent's rationale
that the Act lacked reasonable notice,8 8 or based on the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. The consequence of not examining the underlying legitimacy of the statutory presumptions is that the Mineral Lapse Act allows the
state to take property without just compensation under the guise of abandonment, in violation of constitutional protections.8 9 Failure to utilize any
of these methods of restricting the Court's deferential stance is an indication
of the current Supreme Court tolerance for legislative prerogative in social
and economic legislation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Texaco illustrates the difficulties encountered by a state in efficiently regulating land use by employing retroactive legislation while attempting to
preserve established rights. 9 0 These difficulties, in turn, create complex issues
for the Supreme Court, which must function as a constitutional check on
state action, and yet allow government to creatively address such modern
problems as severed mineral estates.
The Court methodically considered the procedural due process contentions of the appellants, restricting the decision in Mu/lane to state-mandated
adjudicatory proceedings, but failed to sufficiently weigh the burdensome
nature of the law as a violation of substantive due process. The Court did
not adequately address the fundamental reasonableness of a statute that retroactively alters the long-standing legal environment for retaining a vested
property interest, without giving adequate notice. Contrary to earlier cases
and the views expressed by scholars, the Texaco Court assesses this retroactive
law with the more deferential test typically applied to prospective
legislation.
Texaco is, however, implicitly decided on the basis of a substantive due
process reasoning, based on public policy, regarding the limits to state action. The Court viewed the Mineral Lapse Act as justified, given the need
for state action to eliminate dormant mineral interests. It had ample precedent to construe a violation of procedural due process or a taking without
compensation, but chose not to apply these theories in such a way as to defeat the statute. It chose not to invoke the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, refusing to suggest the constitutionally more palatable, but less
to abandon the property. See generally 0. HERFINDAHL & A. KNEESE, ECONOMIc THEORY OF

(1974).
88. The Mineral Lapse Act was passed shortly before midnight by the Indiana Senate on
the last day of the legislative session; thereafter it never received extensive publicity. Polston,
supra note 14, at 90.
89. Here the state is defining abandonment of corporeal and incorporeal mineral interests
contrary to the common law, yet the Supreme Court chose not to examine whether, under this
new definition that creates an irrebuttable presumption the property is sufficiently "abandoned" for the state to take without giving just compensation.
90. The problem, according to P. BASYE, supra note 2, at vi, is that "[b]ecause the original
structure of our system [of land transfers] did not come into being with the ability to visualize its
operation in a later and more complex age, we have seen its efficiency undergoing a progressive
decline during most of the twentieth century to date."
NATURAL RESOURCES
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administratively efficient means of using an individualized hearing procedure to determine abandonment.
The unique nature and problems created by severed mineral interests
limits the precedential value of Texaco for state actions affecting other forms
of property. 9 1 The import of this decision is the indication it provides of an
ideologically divided Court, constrained by its own self-imposed minimal
substantive due process review, trying to strike a proper balance between
legislative prerogative and constitutional safeguards.
Ross Kopi'n

91. See, e.g., Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1901). The Court in Wlson upheld a Pennsylvania statute that provided for the extinguishment of a reserved interest in ground rent if the
owner collected no rent and made no demand for payment for a period of 21 years. Though the
effect of the Pennsylvania statute was to extinguish a fee simple estate of permanent duration,
the Court upheld the legislation. Although heavily relied upon by the Indiana Supreme Court
in its Texaco ruling, and relied upon somewhat by the United States Supreme Court, the facts
are more similar to extinguishment of a debt by the running of a statute of limitations, although
an interest in property is technically lost. It is doubtful that this decision, or that of the Court in
Texaco, can be relied on as precedents for more common types of real property interests.

